

## **The features of technocracy in the “Chinese model” of governance**

The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of technocratic management in the “Chinese model” of governance. It is argued that China, as an authoritarian political regime, is traditionally incorporated into the technocratic style of governance and hence into the mixed (technocratic, corporate and political) style of inter-institutional relations, which largely determines the growth of the efficiency of capitalist industrial production and management. At the same time, it was found that in China there is a significant technocratic-oriented modernization of the authoritarian political regime, although the authoritarianism itself is not a modernization one. It has been recorded that there is implemented the version of “capitalist authoritarianism” in China today, but it “rationalizes tyranny” under the guise of local traditions and culture. The author determined that friendship and particularism are the decisive factors in the technocratization of the authoritarian political regime and governance in China. Therefore, the technocratic nature of power in China is partially denied.

*Keywords: governance, technocratic governance, technocracy, authoritarianism, China.*

## **ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТЕХНОКРАТИЗМУ В «КИТАЙСЬКІЙ МОДЕЛІ» УРЯДУВАННЯ**

Стаття присвячена дослідженню феномену технократичного управління в «китайській моделі» урядування. Аргументовано, що Китай як авторитарний політичний режим, традиційно інкорпорується технократичним стилем урядування, а відтак і змішаним (технократичним, корпоративним і політичним) стилем міжінституційних відносин, що значною мірою детермінує зростання ефективності капіталістичного промислового виробництва та управління. Водночас виявлено, що в Китаї відбувається значна технократично орієнтована модернізація авторитарного політичного режиму, хоча сам авторитаризм у країні за суттю переважно не є модернізаційним. Зафіксовано, що в Китаї сьогодні швидше реалізовано варіант «капіталістичного авторитаризму», але він «раціоналізує тиранію» під прикриттям місцевих традицій і культури. Простежено, що вирішальне значення у технократизації авторитарного політичного режиму й управління в Китаї мають кумівство і партикуляризм. Відтак частково заперечено технократичну природу влади у Китаї.

**Ключові слова:** урядування, технократичне урядування, технократія, авторитаризм, Китай.

Political theory and practice prove that in modern world the process of governance is in correlation with patterns of party/political and technocratic/non-party/apolitical components. Herewith, the crucial role in this context belongs to different processes and institutes/institutions, which determine the features of governance, in particular the system of state government, territorial-administrative formation, political regime etc. Nevertheless, there is an established practice, according to which the higher level of democracy in the country is, the less it is apolitical and the more it is characterized by a multi-party nature in the process of its governance; the more country is personalized (or is described by personalization of power), the less it is political and is more marked by single-party features in its governance and so on. From this perspective a specific case is represented by the post-war (communist) China, which being an authoritarian political regime, is traditionally incorporated into the technocratic style of governance and hence into the mixed (technocratic, corporate and political) style of inter-institutional relations. It largely determines the growth in effectiveness of a capitalistic industrial production and management in China, and thus, from a theoretical point of view, it promotes emergence of some scientific views on government mechanisms in accordance with the results of a synthesis of technocratism, bureaucracy, corporatism and politics<sup>1</sup>. Hence, the problematics of an overall coverage of technocratic peculiarities in the “Chinese model” of governance and under conditions of the established authoritarian regime is currently topical, interesting and theoretically and methodologically significant, as it can testify the existence of a separated cluster of political systems, which goes beyond the already conceptualized parameters and types of governance.

Declared range of problems has been partially described in the works by C. Cao<sup>2</sup>, L. Cheng, L. White<sup>3</sup>, Y. Huang<sup>4</sup>, M. Jacques<sup>5</sup>, V. Lytvyn<sup>6</sup>, W. Mills<sup>7</sup>, M. Pei<sup>8</sup>, H. Ping-ti<sup>9</sup>, R. Scalapino<sup>10</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.; J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California Press 1982.

<sup>2</sup> C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.

<sup>3</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, “The China Quarterly” 1990, vol 121, nr 1, s. 1-35.; L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, “Asian Survey” 1998, vol 38, nr 3, s. 231-264.; L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, “Asian Survey” 2003, vol 43, nr 4, s. 553-597.

<sup>4</sup> Y. Huang, *Rethinking the Beijing Consensus*, “Asia Policy” 2011, nr 11, s. 1-26.

<sup>5</sup> M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, Wyd. Allen Lane 2009.

<sup>6</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizy: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.

<sup>7</sup> W. Mills, *Generational Change in China*, “Problems of Communism” 1983, vol 32, nr 1, s. 16-35.

<sup>8</sup> M. Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Wyd. Harvard 2006.

<sup>9</sup> H. Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*, Wyd. Science Editions 1967.

<sup>10</sup> R. Scalapino, *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Wyd. University of Washington 1972.

X. Zang<sup>11</sup>, B. Zhiyue<sup>12</sup>. On this basis it is appropriate to argue that in China is characterized by a significant technocratic-oriented modernization of the authoritarian political regime, although the authoritarianism itself is not modernizational<sup>13</sup>. The point is, that: firstly, there is no single approach to interpretation of causality of modernization tendencies in China (one group of scientists states that China "has thrown down a challenge" to current western-oriented model of the world order<sup>14</sup>; another group proves that China is experiencing a "prolonged stagnation"<sup>15</sup>, as economic prosperity is not stable till there are established principles of democracy and supremacy of law); secondly, under current state of affairs it is necessary to determine the notion of the "Chinese model" (which, however, is not defined as an "economic miracle"). Therefore, some scholars insist on interpreting the "Chinese model" as an alternative to western liberal democracy, while other state that such model is "offensive", as it neglects human rights, is corrupted and characterized by bad management, economic exploit, inequality, even though it is marked by annual GDP growth.

Hence it is relevant to argue that nowadays in China the version of the "capitalist authoritarianism" is implemented, but it "rationalizes tyranny" under the guise of local traditions and culture<sup>16</sup>. The features of such political regime are: 1) co-existence of economic modernization and technocracy and non-democratic policy; 2) stable predominance of the state control over "dominant heights" of economy; 3) economic management "from top to bottom"; 4) gradual (or additional) reforms of various spheres of the system. They are supplemented by such attributes of the Chinese "capitalistic authoritarianism" as: 1) the "Confucian variant" of a proportion between managers and workers (people are "obliged to obey", and legitimacy of authority is based on its ability to provide "benefit" to people); 2) the principle of connection with Leninists centralism – the so-called "intraparty democracy"; 3) the idea that development is impossible without stability.

On the other hand, it is not possible just to state that "capitalistic authoritarianism" is functioning in China, as historically it has never been monolithic. This is the ground for distinguishing several "Chinese models" of development: experimental "upward" agrarian reform after 1978; economic decentralization and partial liberalization in the 1980s; repressiveness and strengthening of the state control after the Tiananmen Square protests; reformation of the state enterprises by Zhu Rongji in the late 1990s; focusing on Deng Xiaoping's remark that "to be

<sup>11</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787-803.

<sup>12</sup> B. Zhiyue, *The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups*, "Journal of Contemporary China" 2004, vol 13, nr. 39, s. 223-256; B. Zhiyue, *The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutional Representation*, "Issues & Studies" 2008, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 1-41.

<sup>13</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiimi ta protsesuabni vymiry analizu: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 364-366.

<sup>14</sup> M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, Wyd. Allen Lane 2009.; A. Subramanian, *The Inevitable Superpower*, "Foreign Affairs" 2001, vol 90, nr. 5.

<sup>15</sup> M. Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Wyd. Harvard 2006.

<sup>16</sup> V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiimi ta protsesuabni vymiry analizu: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 364-366.

rich is glorious” (the idea of creation of a great number of small and medium businesses); egalitarian and socially-oriented construction of the “scientific development” by Hu Jintao; modern trend introduced by Xi Jinping “that state sector is approaching – private sector is retreating”. From stage to stage we may observe the rise of technocratic component of governance in China. However, even despite this a great many of the Chinese scientists state the impossibility of distinguishing a pure “Chinese model”<sup>17</sup>. The popularity of its concept is largely presupposed by the consequences of the world financial-economic crisis (2008-2009), to be more precise by its influence on western norms and values (and on revealing the drawbacks of “the Washington Consensus” model).

Taking this into consideration, it becomes clear that the “Chinese model” should rather be treated as an anti-model or a coherent economic-managerial approach<sup>18</sup>. As it legitimizes cultural relativism and exceptionality and puts a stress on the state/national sovereignty. Thus, of great importance is evaluation of prospects as to the stability of the Chinese “capitalistic authoritarianism”, in particular on the basis of verification and consideration of its technocratic effectiveness. All this forms the ground for a conclusion that the tendency of the “Chinese authoritarianism” development does not fully correspond with modernization authoritarianism, but is determined by technocracy of political management and governance. To a great extent quite significant is an ability of the Communist Party of China to adjust to changes. Moreover, a range of “reforms” were an exclusive and incontestable example of “political improvisation” aiming at preservation of popularity and stability of the authoritarian regime. Besides, economic successes of China are often connected not with the authoritarian mechanism of their implementation but with liberalization<sup>19</sup>. Thus, it clearly testifies that the “Chinese model” of authoritarianism positions itself as a unique paradigm, the essence of which is reduced to the motto “do everything what can be done”, however basing on the principles of technocratic and meritocratic governance. And that is why evaluation of technocratic nature of the authoritarian political regime in China is important and rational while determining the essence of the country’s political regime itself. It must be done from the historical perspective and must determine general peculiarities of technocracy (but unnecessarily modernization) of authoritarianism.

Technocratic elements of governance in communist China penetrate almost through the whole history of the country. Thus, in the early 1980s the post-Maoist China has been regulated by three generations of technocrats. As a result of a mass transformation of elite in the course of “new” governance by Deng Xiaoping technocrats in the 1980s composed the core of the top-echelon of the Communist Party of China. Besides, at that time China was regulated by a bigger number of people who got education in the systems of science and technology.

<sup>17</sup> *Dialogue with China: Towards ‘Harmonious Society’ Governance, Participation, and Social Cohesion*, Wilton Park conference, November 4-7, 2010.

<sup>18</sup> V. Lyytyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsini ta protsesualni vymiry analizu: nauch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014, s. 364-366.

<sup>19</sup> Y. Huang, *Rethinking the Beijing Consensus*, “Asia Policy” 2011, nr. 11, s. 24.

Therefore, a full-rate technocratic management rooted in the Chinese politics. Over the last decades successive generations of technocratic government in China have often been described as "engineers, who transformed into politicians" who have contributed to the growth of the national economy and sometimes to modernization of the country. That is why technocratic tendencies are incorporated into the Chinese politics and at present time have significant effect on social, economic and political issues. It is also revealed in the fact that after the death of Mao Zedong a new generation of managers, which was described as technocratic, occupied dominant positions in the political sphere of mainland China. In the time of Deng Xiaoping, in particular in the early 1980s, the Communist Party of China (CPC) "enrolled" new members to their political force from various social and professional groups<sup>20</sup>. Though, the CPC in the days of Mao Zedong was mainly under the rule of soldiers, peasants and workers, in the post-Maoist China all of them were changed by high-educated scientists and engineers.

To realize successful political and economic reforms Deng Xiaoping and his satellites in the course of the twelfth party congress (1982-1987) in the early 1980s started changing the revolutionary political elite by a generation of a technocratic elite<sup>21</sup>. Later, such transformation of elite reached its peak at the 13<sup>th</sup> (1987-1992), 14<sup>th</sup> (1992-1997) and 15<sup>th</sup> (1997-2002) party congresses. It appeared, that the majority of new leaders in the post-Maoist China are men, qualified as engineers and natural scientists, who worked as economic executives and industrial managers<sup>22</sup>. All this was inherited for future, as technocrats were represented in the structure of the Central Committee of all subsequent CPC congresses and thus they were interpreted as a political elite of China. Thus, the conclusion that is the "technocratic rotation", which took place in the early 1980s, in fact marked a turning point in the political process of authoritarianism development in China as it became a step of national modernization and economic development of the country. Successful reforms in the frames of technocratic management/governance since the 1980s has led to unprecedented rate of economic increase in China and has been inherited in future, in particular after the world financial-economic crisis, which took place in 2008-2009.

Significant transformation of the elite and great influence of technocratic experts on the politics of China have also paved the way to enlargement of the scientific elite in the Chinese society. Thus, such "elite transformation" in the post-Maoist China has led to social changes over the last decades, as during this period: 1) significantly growth the number of students in colleges; 2) the majority of students became entered into engineering specialities; 3) most of personnel are moderately or highly educated<sup>23</sup>. Besides, over the last decades they observe a large

<sup>20</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

<sup>21</sup> W. Mills, *Generational Change in China*, "Problems of Communism" 1983, vol 32, nr. 1, s. 16-35.

<sup>22</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 789.

<sup>23</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

increase of students who get foreign and national diploma of higher education, especially in the sphere of science and technology. As a result there is a large number of people, who obtain sufficient potential to become technocratic elite in future.

At the same time, it is quite notable that technocracy in China does not correspond with the theory of the western type. The main reason is its implementation under the conditions of functioning and with the aim to preserve authoritarian (not democratic) political regime. Thus, the notion of western technocracy cannot be suitable in the case of the post-Maoist technocratic governance. It is especially evident taking into account M. Weber's remark that modern politics consists of two groups of new elites – technically trained professional career administrators and professional party politicians. However, such statement cannot be applied to China in which there is no strict division line between technocrats and party functionaries<sup>24</sup>. On the contrary, some scientists argue that China belongs and traditionally belonged to a meritocratic type of society, but such peculiarity was modified in the times of Mao's regime, especially during the so-called "Cultural revolution". The point is that, in traditional China education was the main route to the upward social mobility. And though not all members of the ruling circle received education "taking official examinations was the only mechanism of social and political mobility"<sup>25</sup>. Some Chinese scientists also state that "money may directly transfer a person into a higher status by buying studentship, offices and official names"<sup>26</sup>, but education, as a rule is the "ladder to success"<sup>27</sup>. Such logics was not eclipsed even by the republican period over 1912-1949, when "China was suffering continuous civil conflicts between the field commanders"<sup>28</sup>, and later between political parties (Communist and Nationalistic). As at that time the prevailing majority of political leaders ascended from the warfare sphere. On the other hand, in the times of Mao a large number of peasants, workers and soldiers, many of whom were illiterate, "floated" to the Red Army and the CPC. As a result the majority of political leaders were soldiers, peasants and representatives of people of lower classes<sup>29</sup>. Therefore, enrolment of personnel, as a rule, was originated on class affiliation, work experience and political loyalty, but not on the level of education, technical training, and competence.

But this tendency was annulled when Deng Xiaoping entered the top echelon of power, in particular after the death of Mao in 1976. In 1978, being the prime-minister, Deng Xiaoping declared that "intellectuals should not be treated as "someone's weapon", but on the contrary

<sup>24</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

<sup>25</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 17.

<sup>26</sup> H. Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*, Wyd. Science Editions 1967, s. 256.

<sup>27</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.

<sup>28</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 18.

<sup>29</sup> R. Scalapino, *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Wyd. University of Washington 1972.

must be respected as the "core of modernization program"<sup>30</sup>. Being a leading reformist, he commenced post-Maoist reforms from the "driving forces": 1) first of all, the party under the head of modernizers started working for the sake of economic restoration and overcoming of complete poverty in the country; 2) the party and other elites in the governmental and military spheres were united by the idea of promoting China towards establishment of modern, industrial economy of welfare and advanced technologies. Therefore, in the process of reforms old revolutionary staff was replaced with people, who were politically reliable, young, energetic, better educated, competent and professional. The majority of new leaders were qualified engineers. Herewith, this massive transition of leaders in the early 1980s predetermined appearance of technocracy and technocratism in the post-Maoist authoritarian government.

Of great interest is the fact that the Chinese political elite in the early 1980s was mainly composed of professionals, who obtained education in the spheres of natural and physical sciences, and not universalists. That is why, the key attributes of that time technocrats were technical education, professional activity and leadership positions. Studying the level of education, speciality, career and structure of the Central Committee of the CPC of that time the researchers found out that technocrats played both the role of party workers and state officials. Besides, a new elite of technocrats came into power both due to their advanced education and being evaluated as protégé of the existing system. Thus, enrolment and promotion of new technocratic leaders at that time was based on personal ties, as well as educational criteria and formal procedures. X. Zang states that on the contrary later post-Maoist leaders were regarded as "bureaucratic or political technocracy, and not just simple technocracy"<sup>31</sup>. The scholar singled out two important terms – technocrats and bureaucrats. The latter are state or party personnel, who work in the system of state management and organization, irrespective of the engineering education level. That is why the scholar argues that the "growth of technocratic experts in politics has not led to their monopoly in the political sphere in the post-Maoist China, as career officials remained a significant political force as well"<sup>32</sup>. The Central Committee of the CPC of that time (first half of the 1990s) "was determined as the union between career bureaucrats and technocrats". As a result career bureaucrats required technocrats' assistance, advice and expert evaluations with respect to the national aims of economic development and modernization, and thus, the former were obliged to share power with the latter. Technocrats "were also to cooperate with career bureaucrats to climb the political hierarchy. Hence, in the post-Maoist China technocrats came into power, because it was required by their party leaders, as well as due to their party membership. Besides, technocrats were and still are interested in China efficiency.

<sup>30</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 12.

<sup>31</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 792.

<sup>32</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 801.

Later, as L. Cheng and L. White note, the most powerful technocrats came out of the shadows of their political patrons or other outstanding leaders. Thus, in the composition of the 15<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the CPC (in the late 1990s – early 2000s) technocrats were obviously predominating. All members of the Permanent Committee of the Central Committee, which was the most powerful group, were technocrats<sup>33</sup>. On the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, top-technocrat Jiang Zemin became the core of the third generation of the CPC leadership. That is why, under the charge of Jiang Zemin the 15<sup>th</sup> party congress approved a “full-scale” technocratic governance. Scholars also state that though the Chinese technocratic elite came to power because of the education level and professional qualification, but friendship and particularism are still influential in the process of the Central Committee formation.

To examine the origin and characteristics of technocrats in the political circle of China, the biggest two elite groups in the country have been analyzed – the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, including the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Permanent Committee of the Central Committee and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). In account were taken three data types as to the members of the abovementioned groups of elites: 1) demographic information, concerning age and gender; 2) education level; 3) career and job experience, including participation in various organizations (party, state management and military service). All basic data, which are analyzed, were mainly obtained from the research carried out by X. Zang<sup>34</sup>, L. Cheng and L. White<sup>35</sup>, C. Cao<sup>36</sup>, B. Zhiyue<sup>37</sup> and other scholars.

According to X. Zang<sup>38</sup>, “the Central Committee was a useful option, which helped leading politicians to transfer the ideas of the Chinese society, and its composition may be treated as an institutional representation of various approaches. In general, all members of the Central Committee represent the elite in the political picture of China, while “changes in the Central Committee show wide social, economic, and political changes in the country in general”. In particular, the Permanent Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee are the most powerful political figures in the Chinese politics. These three political elites design technocrats as people, described by three features: technical education at the level of college or higher educational institution, professional experience and management experience. This research also deals with a scientific elite group of China – the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. The CAS is an apex of the scientific hierarchy in the CPR and is one type of the academies, which combines research and practical activity. The CAS is a unique group of scientists

<sup>33</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, “Asian Survey” 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 231-264.

<sup>34</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787.

<sup>35</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, “Asian Survey” 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.

<sup>36</sup> C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.

<sup>37</sup> B. Zhiyue, *The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutional Representation*, “Issues & Studies” 2008, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 1-41.; B. Zhiyue, *The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups*, “Journal of Contemporary China” 2004, vol 13, nr. 39, s. 223-256.

<sup>38</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787.



from China, which has reputation similar to those in other countries of the world<sup>39</sup>. It is designed for academic leadership in developing and implementation of policy in the spheres of science and leading measures at the national level. An important aspect of the CAS is that its members are loyal party members, especially members of the Central Committee of the CPC. According to C. Cao, as a rule the CAS' members are a double elite. In particular, the CAS presidents are elite natural scientists and party members. To become a member of the Central Committee of the CPC means for the scientific elite to be a part of the political elite and improve their own social image. As the majority of the Central Committee members are scientists and engineers, the scientific elite is also offered to join the ruling circles of the CPC.

Provided statistical data show that: 1) in China one can always observe a significant circulation of elites in the history of the CPC leadership<sup>40</sup>, herewith a growing number of leaders are technocrats; 2) the main composition of the Political Bureau and the Permanent Committee of the CPC is represented by professional engineers and senior engineers, who obtained higher education (often are doctors of sciences), as well as officers from military academies<sup>41</sup>; 3) an average age of members of the Political Bureau is from 55 to 67, though there is a tendency to youthification; 4) in gender perspective there is over-representativeness of male among political leaders, especially male-technocrats<sup>42</sup>. Besides, there are other educational tendencies among last Chinese leaders: a) a bigger number of diploma holders; b) a less number of "S&E" degree holders; c) a bigger number of foreign students or those with experience of working abroad.

It is notable that career paths of current Chinese leaders have much in common, as over 20% of members of the Central Committee of the CPC mix their careers (e.g. former experience in two or more sectors). Most of them "make their political career being the heads of plants, bureaus in the industrial spheres, mayors or ministers in the State Council"<sup>43</sup>. Almost the same number of the Central Committee members climb the ladder as party personnel. However, official career paths for technocrats are usually formed on the background of family, school relations and work with top-leaders (being personal assistants etc.). Thus, L. Cheng and L. White<sup>44</sup> state, that friendship and particularism are the decisive factors in formation the Central Committee of the CPC and for technocracy of the authoritarian political regime in China. And this makes some researchers deny the technocratic nature of authority in modern China, as they believe that technocrats must be real technical experts, whereas some modern leaders in China belong to this group in name only. Their "technical expert evaluation" is more concerned with supporting their political status, than with the ability to solve the problems of

<sup>39</sup> C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.

<sup>40</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.

<sup>41</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.

<sup>42</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, "Asian Survey" 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 243.

<sup>43</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 588.

<sup>44</sup> L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, "Asian Survey" 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 243.

China. Besides, the upper hand belongs to the idea that in the Chinese leadership exists a disproportion of the engineers, interpreted as politicians. However, such personalities represent a very modest percent of the Chinese society.

## References

1. C. Cao, *China's Scientific Elite*, Wyd. Routledge Curzon 2004.
2. J. Chalmers, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, Wyd. University of California Press 1982.
3. L. Cheng, L. White, *Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy*, "The China Quarterly" 1990, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 1-35.
4. L. Cheng, L. White, *The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin*, "Asian Survey" 1998, vol 38, nr. 3, s. 231-264.
5. L. Cheng, L. White, *The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, "Asian Survey" 2003, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 553-597.
6. *Dialogue with China: Towards 'Harmonious Society' Governance, Participation, and Social Cohesion*, Wilton Park conference, November 4-7, 2010.
7. Y. Huang, *Rethinking the Beijing Consensus*, "Asia Policy" 2011, nr. 11, s. 1-26.
8. M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, Wyd. Allen Lane 2009.
9. V. Lytvyn, *Politychni rezhymy suchasnosti: instytutsiini ta protsesualni vymiry analizy: navch. posibnyk*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.
10. W. Mills, *Generational Change in China*, "Problems of Communism" 1983, vol 32, nr. 1, s. 16-35.
11. M. Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Wyd. Harvard 2006.
12. T. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1998.
13. H. Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*, Wyd. Science Editions 1967.
14. R. Scalapino, *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Wyd. University of Washington 1972.
15. A. Subramanian, *The Inevitable Superpower*, "Foreign Affairs" 2001, vol 90, nr. 5.
16. X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 787-803.
17. B. Zhiyue, *The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups*, "Journal of Contemporary China" 2004, vol 13, nr. 39, s. 223-256.
18. B. Zhiyue, *The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutional Representation*, "Issues & Studies" 2008, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 1-41.